

The Fight Against Climate Change: The Clock Is Ticking

Report on the United Nations Climate Conference
in Poznan (Poland), 1-12 December 2008

Publication coordination: Anne Chetaille (GRET)
Editorial support: Jean-Pierre Rolland (GRET)
Layout: Hélène Gay (GRET)

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This report was written by:

Anne Chetaille (GRET)
Morgane Créach (RAC-F)
Swan Fauveaud (GERES)

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Bad Weather for the Planet

Weather predictions are becoming more and more exact. We now know how to predict tomorrow's weather with relative certainty. The major advance, however, is that we can predict the consequences of the climate change underway within a small margin of error.

These consequences will be global in that they will ultimately effect the daily lives of everyone on our planet. Those best off will necessarily have to change their behavior, both individually and as a group. But, the inhabitants of island states are, for their part, facing the real threat of seeing their lands submerged. And the day-to-day activities of hundreds of millions of rural people in the least developed countries run the risk of being definitively sterilized by the disappearance of forests, drying up of ground waters, and the advance of desertification.

As a result, it is no longer the time to debate the reality of the risks, nor even the time to determine what measures could be taken to fight climate change. The major lines are known. Their application remains to be negotiated. And, as the title of this report clearly indicated, the clock is ticking. A new agreement on the climate regime beyond 2012 must be signed by the end of 2009 in Copenhagen. The large countries—the United States leading the pack—are playing the clock by refusing to commit to ambitious targets and measures. Countries' diverging interests also impede progress toward the inevitable finalization of the agreement.

Two general groups of French associations have taken note of their proximity to this major cause, the fight against climate change. These are the environmental associations that have long worked on this subject, and the development and relief associations that have more recently become aware of it. Access to development for poor or marginalized populations demands that environmental sustainability be ensured; and environmental requirements cannot be met without paying particular attention to their consequences on the poorest.

Coordination SUD and RAC-F felt that it would be relevant for these two families of associations to come together around the issue of climate change and that doing so would be an effective way to carry their positions to the international negotiations. A working group was set up within Coordination SUD. Co-run by the *Réseau Action Climat France* (RAC-F) and GRETE, this group met several times in preparation for the Conference in Poznan in December 2008.

This report contains two parts: a look at the striking moments of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Poznan, and an assessment of the operational implications of the Conference's decisions on development and relief non-governmental organizations' practices. This was a first step in a common approach to sustainable development. There will be more. ●

*Jean-Louis Vielajus, President of Coordination SUD
Sandrine Mathy, President of RAC-F*

Key Points in the Negotiations

■ *Anne Chetaille (GRET) and Morgane Créach (RAC-F)*

Introduction

Halfway between the Bali Conference and the much-anticipated meeting in Copenhagen, the fourteenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention and the fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP14/MOP4, Poznan, 1-12 December 2008) was a rendezvous not to be missed in the process of elaborating a new agreement on the long-term climate regime.

The Bali Action Plan gave the countries party to the Convention two years to determine the outline of the climate agreement beyond 2012, covering five key areas: shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, financing, and technology. Involving developing and developed countries, this Action Plan marked a major shift in the international climate negotiations. It also aimed to send a clear signal to the international community on the urgent need to act advocated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

In compliance with this roadmap, the year 2008 was devoted to a phase of exploring and exchanging viewpoints on the various areas of the future climate agreement. One of the primary challenges in Poznan was to lay the foundations of this agreement based on the countries' proposals and adopt a work program for 2009. In addition to a "post-2012 agenda", the COP14/MOP4 was also supposed to examine a series of points on implementing the Convention and the Protocol ("pre-2012 agenda"), notably in regard to financing, technologies, and the review of the Protocol (article 9).

More than 9,000 people, including nearly half the negotiators, were present. The "post-2012 agenda" occupied a central place in the conference, with several contact groups, thematic workshops, and an informal ministerial round table. Against all expectations, sharp discussions took place on the "pre-2012 agenda", notably on the Adaptation Fund Board, review of the Protocol — including extending the collection of 2% of the income from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to the Protocol's other two flexibility mechanisms—and improvement of the CDM.

However, by the end of the 15 days of negotiations, the countries had adopted barely twenty or so decisions, compared to 30 in Bali. In the end, the Poznan Conference seemed mainly to have been a routine rendezvous between Bali and Copenhagen. The political will was not there and this conference did not generate the vitality needed to reach an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen. The industrialized countries did not shine with exemplary emission reduction commitments for the post-2012 regime. They also disappointed developing countries in regard to the financing and technologies needed to meet their current and future needs.

The international political context did not create conditions conducive to major announcements. Even though the negotiators unanimously agreed that the economic crisis must not dis-

tract the international community from doing what it needs to do in regard to climate change, the crisis has favored a certain amount of timidity. Among other things, the American presidential transition period and the European Union's internal discussions on the "Energy-Climate Package", adopted on 12 December, also helped dampen the Poznan Conference's vitality.

As Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), said, the clock is ticking. The scientific proof is incontrovertible: climate change is underway. The international community now has less than twelve months to reach an ambitious and fair agreement in Copenhagen. In Poznan, Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, called for strong mobilization by leaders. Developed countries must prove their leadership by setting ambitious reduction targets for themselves. Expectations are high for the European Union and the United States in particular. The support of developing countries—the most advanced among them—will also be vital. They must participate according to their responsibility and capacity to act. Significant initiatives have been taken by Brazil, China and India in regard to the environment and more specifically the fight against climate change. These initiatives must be expanded and showcased in the framework of international negotiations.

Negotiations on the "Beyond-2012": Looking for a Second Wind

The Poznan Conference devoted many hours to discussing the "post-2012 agenda". All eyes were on the ad hoc working group in charge of determining the future commitments of industrialized Annex I countries (AWG-KP) and the ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). Yet, it must be noted that the overall results are mixed. Of course, a negotiating agenda was adopted for 2009. Several working sessions are thereby planned to lead to an agreement by year's end in Copenhagen. However, in regard to content (the shared vision and the four pillars—mitigation, adaptation, financing and technologies), no major progress was made. Industrialized countries are still timid in their commitments to reduce emissions by 2020. The discussions on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) remain confined to the technical level and have not reached the political level.

The Year 2009: Shifting from "Discussions" to "Negotiations"

The two primary negotiating bodies for the new agreement beyond 2012 are AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA.¹ These groups met three times in 2008 (Bangkok in April, Bonn in June, and Accra in August). During these meetings, the AWG-KP focused mainly on the means available to the Parties to Annex I to attain their future reduction targets for 2020, and on methodology issues. The AWG-LCA's discussions focused on the four pillars of the Bali Action Plan: emission reduction, adaptation, financing, and technology transfers.

During these meetings, numerous ideas and proposals were formulated on what the new global climate agreement could be. However, the discussions stayed at the "sharing points of view"

¹ These two groups were set up respectively in Montreal at the end of 2005 and in Bali at the end of 2007.

stage and did not shift to “negotiating” mode. Consequently, for a majority of countries, it was crucial that the conference result in a negotiating agenda for 2009.²

The AWG-LCA’s conclusions record this progress toward “negotiating” mode. The Chair of the group is, in this way, responsible for establishing:

- a document on implementing the Bali Action Plan. This document needs to take into account any possible submissions by the Parties received before 6 February 2009. It is supposed to be examined during the AWG-LCA’s fifth session scheduled for 30 March to 9 April in Bonn. Finally, it needs to identify the points of convergence among the Parties for the final document that will be adopted in Copenhagen;
- a negotiating text: This text will be examined by the AWG-LCA during its sixth meeting in Bonn from 1 to 12 June 2009. This negotiating text must take into account the results of the AWG-LCA’s fifth session and any submissions from the Parties prior to 24 April 2009.

The Chair of the AWG-KP was also tasked with producing two papers. The first focuses on the amendments one could envisage adopting in compliance with Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol (absolute emission reduction targets for Annex I countries), and will be examined by the AWG-KP during its seventh session in 2009. The second paper covers the issues that must be resolved by the AWG-KP (and listed in paragraph 5 of the work program) for examination by the Parties in April 2009. This paper should lead, by June 2009, to a text that will be submitted for adoption during the conference in Copenhagen.

The AWG-KP has also promised to:

- adopt conclusions during its seventh session in April 2009 and produce a draft amendment on the scope of the reductions to be made by the Parties listed in Annex I as a group; and
- adopt conclusions (and any draft decision or amendment) during its eighth session in June 2009 on the role that the countries listed in Annex I will be called upon to play, individually or collectively, in the total amount of emission reductions that the said Parties must make as a group.

In Poznan, the will to enter a negotiating phase at the start of 2009 was therefore officially enacted. However, this progress cannot hide the noteworthy divergences that remain between countries on the crucial elements of the future agreement. Let us hope that the three negotiating sessions planned in 2009 prior to Copenhagen (the two AWGs have allowed the possibility of organizing an additional session if needed) will make it possible to narrow the gap between the Parties’ points of view on the content of the new international regime to fight climate change.

Shared Vision and the Pillars of the Bali Action Plan: Halfhearted Results

As mentioned previously, the negotiations on the period beyond 2012 (post-2012) must begin in 2009. Within the AWG-LCA, the countries have continued their talks in “discussion” mode based on the assembly document prepared by the Chair of this group, contrary to the expectations of some countries and NGOs that would have liked to see the negotiations begin at the start of the Conference in Poznan. As far as content is concerned, few new proposals were made by the countries.

² Legally speaking, the Secretariat must officially transmit the negotiating texts to the Parties at least six months before their envisaged adoption, or by June 2009.

● *Shared Vision*

The shared vision includes both the scope, nature and principles that will guide cooperation under the new climate agreement, and a long-term emission reduction target. In accordance with the work program that was set in March 2008, the plan was to address the question of the shared vision more specifically during the group's fourth meeting in Poznan. After the third meeting, the Chair of the group had been invited to compile the Parties' various proposals in a document ("assembly document") that could serve as a negotiating text for the Conference in Poznan. The work program established in March 2008, also planned to address more specifically the question of the shared vision during the group's fourth meeting in Poznan. Very little time (one and a half hours) was ultimately devoted to the question of the shared vision, compared to three hours for the other pillars. Indeed, the working group's decision was challenged by the G77/China that felt that it was too early to tackle this question and that it should wait for the workshop and informal ministerial round table scheduled during the Conference.

Following the contact group discussions, during the workshop and the informal ministerial round table, despite appearances, points of divergence were still numerous. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, as well as the principle of fairness, were evoked by several industrialized and developing countries. However, very different interpretations of these principles hide behind this apparent consensus. For developing countries, notably China and India, developed countries, who are most responsible, must fully shoulder the emission reduction burden. For their part, industrialized countries acknowledge that they need to be examples but believe that all countries must participate, and must do so according to each country's responsibility and capacity to act. This position is also supported by the island states even though they are members of the G77.

In regard to the long-term reduction target (greenhouse gas concentration stabilization level, emission peaks, quantified reduction target, country group contributions), the European Union's proposals are the most detailed. Other countries such as Japan and Canada are much vaguer in their targets, especially the medium-term quantified reduction targets for Annex I countries. The G77 as a group has said little on the whole. This contrasts with the interventions by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) that has called for stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations below 350 ppm CO₂ eq, and a maximum temperature increase of 1.5°C by the end of the century. The least developed country (LDC) group has taken a position in favor of a temperature increase of between 2°C and 2.4°C. Beyond group positions, one will note the various proposals of certain Central American and LDC countries, such as Madagascar and Bangladesh, that tend to align with the European Union's position.

● *Mitigation*

For the "mitigation" pillar of the Bali Action Plan, the Parties are invited to work on eight types of measures or methods, notably:

- mitigation "commitments or initiatives" in developed countries that are "measurable, reportable and verifiable";
- mitigation "measures" by developing countries that are "supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner";
- general methods and positive incentive measures in regard to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and
- sectoral or other methods, including the possibility of recourse to markets.

> Principal Positions on the Long-Term Reduction Objective³

	Level of Greenhouse Gas Concentration Stabilization or Temperature Increase	Emission Peaks	Quantified Long-term Reduction Target	Contribution According to Country Group
G77/China	NSP ⁴	NSP	NSP	Emission reductions of 25%-40% by developed countries by 2020. National mitigation actions by non-Annex I countries, with the assistance of financing, technology and capacity building, in a way that is measurable, reportable and verifiable.
Island States (AOSIS)	Maximum stabilization level: 350 ppm CO ₂ eq. Maximum temperature increase: 1.5°C	around 2015	At least 85% reduction by 2050.	Reduction of more than 40% by 2020 compared to the 1990 levels for Annex I countries, and 95% by 2050. As a group, need for non-Annex I countries to deviate substantially from their projected path over a comparable period.
LDCs	Maximum temperature increase: between 2°C and 2,4°C	between 2000 and 2015	NSP	NSP
				.../...

³ Ideas and proposals on paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Revised note by the Chair, 10 December 2008. FCCC/AWG/LCA/2008/16/Rev.1.

⁴ NSP: No Stated Position.

> **Principal Positions on the Long-Term Reduction Objective**
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	Level of Greenhouse Gas Concentration Stabilization or Temperature Increase	Emission Peaks	Quantified Long-Term Reduction Target	Contribution According to Country Group
European	Maximum temperature increase: 2°C	in the next 10 to 15 years around 2020	Reduction of at least 50% compared to 1990 levels by 2050. A per capita emission reduction of 2 tons by 2050.	Reduction of more than 25%-40% compared to 1990 levels for developed countries by 2020; approximately 30% by 2020 with international efforts. A 15% to 30% deviation in the emissions trajectories of developing countries compared to the current projected trend, in addition to the absolute reduction commitments of 25%-40% for industrialized countries by 2020; level of effort based on capability, responsibility, mitigation potential, and national circumstances.
Japan	NSP	in the next 10 to 20 years	At least 50% reduction by 2050.	Mitigation measures for all countries based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Other Countries	Scientific data insufficient to determine a reference threshold (Australia).	around 2020 (Canada)	At least 50% reduction by 2050 (Canada).	Indicative range of 25% to 40% for reductions by Annex I countries (New Zealand). Emission reduction actions by the maximum number of countries, including the large economies, in function of national circumstances (Australia).

The discussions during the first three AWG-LCA meetings allowed countries to exchange points of view on these various subjects and go into greater detail on some of them during specific workshops (measures to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and sectoral approaches).

In Poznan, the discussions focused primarily on mitigation measures for developing countries and on three criteria—measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV). In regard to the first point, two topics in particular were discussed:

- Differentiation between developing countries: this topic continues to be a source of tension. The G77/China remains opposed to any differentiated treatment among non-Annex I countries, unlike the wishes of developed countries such as Japan or even the European Union;
- National mitigation action registries: a consensus emerged on this topic, introduced by South Africa and the Republic of Korea. These registries could contain voluntary, non-binding actions. The two countries nevertheless have different visions on how these actions would be financed: recourse to the carbon market (Republic of Korea) or public funds (South Africa). These financed actions would, for example, include: (i) sustainable development policies and measures, programmatic clean development mechanism (CDM), or 'no-lose' sectoral crediting baselines (South African proposal), or (ii) low-cost unilateral actions (energy efficiency), actions with positive costs financed with resources other than the carbon market (transportation, housing), and additional actions financed by the carbon market and sectoral credits such as for cement (the European Union's proposal).⁵

The MRV criteria apply to developed countries' commitments in regard to the financial and technical support and capacity building to be provided to developing countries, and to the mitigation actions undertaken by developing countries. They must make it possible to better evaluate developed countries' actions and, by so doing, better judge how exemplary they are.

The Poznan discussions more specifically focused on the scope of what is supposed to be measured, reported and verified, and how this could be accomplished. For the European Union, reporting on mitigation actions in developing countries should be more frequent and based on international guidelines, and verification should be international. For South Africa, the MRV criteria must apply to developed countries (emission reduction commitments and support for developing countries) and developing countries' mitigation actions that are supported by adequate financing and technologies.

● *Adaptation*

The Parties met twice (contact group) to identify points of convergence on an "assembly document" proposed by the Chair of the AWG-LCA. The discussions on adaptation beyond 2012 have been relatively consensual: priority needs and measures (early warning systems, vulnerability mapping, information exchange, regional excellence centers, capacity building, etc.), the synergies to generate with other processes such as natural disaster risk management or reduction, and the need to increase financing. However, certain sensitive topics were avoided to some degree, notably the sources of the necessary new and additional financing, the identity of priority recipient countries, and the establishment of insurance mechanisms.

⁵ Guérin, E., *Quick overview of the general state of play of UNFCCC negotiations after Poznan*, Policy Brief No. 9/2008, Climate Change, IDDRI.

> Risk Management and Climate Insurance

Recourse to risk management mechanisms-insurance in particular-is an emerging issue in the climate negotiations. A specific workshop on this subject was given in Poznan. Overall, the countries agreed on the need to link risk reduction and adaptation. In doing so, it is crucial to rely on natural risk reduction and management experiences: risk and vulnerability assessment methods, early warning systems, etc. But, several countries insisted on the fact that we must take prior action and not merely repair the damages. Indeed, for LDCs, risk reduction assistance all too often remain an ex-post approach with emergency relief in line with the amount of media exposure.

When it comes to risk management, risk transfer systems such as insurance can be necessary. Developing countries-especially LDCs and small island states-are the most vulnerable to climate hazards (cyclones, floods, droughts, etc.). In most cases, insurance for these risks is not available in these countries. Under the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), several insurance mechanisms are possible depending on the level (micro, meso or regional) and type of risk involved. Even though climate hazard insurance cannot be the one and only solution, it inspires curiosity among developing countries. For Bangladesh (LDC group), micro-insurance could be useful in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, for example through harvest insurance for small farmers. Island states for their part propose, as part of the post-2012 agreement, the establishment of a multi-faceted mechanism built around three components: insurance, compensation and risk management. Under the auspices of the Convention, this mechanism could be financed by developed countries and public-private partnerships.

● Financing and Technology Transfer

Financing and technology transfer are two vital subjects for developing countries. The negotiations in Bali had shown just how important these subjects were to these countries. Since the last AWG-LCA meeting in Accra (August 2008), the "technology transfer" and "financing" pillars of the Bali Action Plan have been examined jointly. As early as the opening of the Conference and the AWG-LCA's fourth meeting in Poznan, the developing countries made it clear that their level of ambition in regard to the shared vision and their mitigation actions was, to a large extent, conditional on the progress that would be made on these two subjects.

The contact group discussions on these two pillars did not identify the hoped-for points of convergence between developing and developed countries. The G77/China's proposal on setting up an improved mechanism for technology transfer did not receive a precise and structured response from developed countries. Divergences remain on two major points:

- The institutional mechanisms to govern technology transfer. The G77/China proposes creating new subsidiary bodies and a multilateral technology fund. Concerned with effectiveness, developed countries support an approach that utilizes and strengthens the Convention's existing mechanisms.
- Intellectual property rights (IPRs) on clean technologies. For the G77/China, IPRs are a barrier to the transfer of advanced technologies. They would like the intellectual property regime to be relaxed for these technologies.

No new proposals were made in regard to financing. Norway and Mexico reiterated the proposals they made in Accra (respectively, auctioning part of the quota units allocated to Annex I countries in order to finance adaptation, and creating a multilateral climate change fund fed by mandatory contributions defined according to criteria).⁶ The umbrella countries, espe-

⁶ Cf. Chetaille A., Créach M., *Ambition et équité : les incontournables du futur régime climatique post-2012*, Proceedings of the workshop on 25 September 2008, November 2008.

cially Australia, Canada and the United States, insisted on effectiveness and efficiency-principles that should be at the heart of the future financial architecture on the climate. Accordingly, all existing sources of financing must be used, both in and out of the Convention. Also supported by Japan and the European Union, these countries emphasize the private sector's role in catalyzing investments to fight climate change.⁷ They base their position on the Convention Secretariat's report on financing and investments that states that the private sector currently totals 88% of financial flows. Developing countries did not hide their annoyance with this type of discourse, insisting that developed countries cannot make the private sector carry the burden. They must live up to their responsibilities.

Future Reduction Targets for Annex I Countries

Since the Bali Conference, few countries other than the European Union and Japan have announced absolute reduction commitments. More announcements from the other developed countries were expected at the COP14.

In Poznan, the AWG-KP's work in contact groups and workshops focused primarily on four major issues:

- the adoption of the Annex I countries' emission reduction range for 2020;
- the resources for Annex I countries to attain their reduction targets;
- the nature of Annex I countries' future reduction commitments; and
- the link between the work done under the auspices of the Protocol's working group and the work done by the Convention's working group.

● *Annex I Countries' Emission Reduction Range:* *Copied and Pasted from the Bali Decision*

According to the Chair of the AWG-KP, the adoption of conclusions on emission reduction ranges for Annex I countries was supposed to be a highpoint of the Conference in Poznan. This call was not followed by action, whether in contact group discussions or during the workshop devoted to this subject.

The European Union is the only one to have clearly put numbers on the table: the necessity of cutting global emissions in half by 2050, and reducing industrialized countries' emissions by 30% in 2020 compared to 1990. It also indicated that, in a scenario of an emission concentration of 450 ppm CO₂ eq, a deviation in non-Annex I countries' emissions of 15% to 30% in 2020 compared to the current projected trend would be necessary in addition to Annex I countries' emission reductions.⁸ This range was poorly received by developing countries. They firmly restated that the AWG-KP's mandate was supposed to be limited to defining Annex I countries' future reduction commitments. India called this range "unacceptable".

The other industrialized countries have not mentioned any national reduction commitments or even a reduction range common to the Parties to Annex I. Japan has simply mentioned a global long-term emission reduction target of halving emissions by 2050 without giving 1990 as the reference year.

⁷ Cf. Report by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat, *Investment and financial flows to address climate change: an update*, November 2008.

⁸ These data come from a study published by Niklas Höhne and Michel den Elzen, two of the IPCC's authors. This deviation is based on two important assumptions: that Annex I countries lower their emissions by 25% to 40% by 2020, and that the deforestation rate follows a real-time scenario

In the contact group, the G77/China, India and South Africa have pleaded for the emission reduction range to be "at least" 25% to 40% for Annex I countries, insisting that the IPCC's 25/40% range does not take into account lifestyle changes that could increase the margin of reduction.

In conclusion, no major progress was made on Annex I countries' commitments for the second commitment period. The AWG-KP's conclusions in regard to the emission reduction range for Annex I countries are identical to those in the Bali Action Plan.⁹

In Bali, developing countries had taken a step forward by agreeing, under cover of support from industrialized countries, to undertake national actions to reduce their emissions. In return, they expected large gestures from industrialized countries when it came to their emission reduction commitments.

● *Confirmed Use of Flexibility Mechanisms to Attain Reduction Targets*

As part of the discussions on Annex I countries' means to attain their reduction targets, divergences surfaced in regard to the specific role of flexibility mechanisms (international carbon market, joint implementation, clean development mechanism). For the European Union, future reduction targets should be attained through both domestic measures and flexibility mechanisms. Developing countries, especially representatives of island states (AOSIS), however, believe that the Annex I countries' future emission reductions should take place primarily on the domestic level. In their view, the CDM does not reduce overall emissions for countries with commitments because it is an emission offset mechanism. It may even increase these countries' emissions if the project additionality principle is not respected. In the contact group, South Africa called for a domestic emission reduction target of 25% to 40% for Annex I countries and the use of flexibility mechanisms only after the target has been attained.

The AWG-KP's conclusions maintain Annex I countries' recourse to flexibility mechanisms and to land use, land-use change and forestry to attain their reduction targets. The conclusions merely recalled that "the use of emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms *should* be supplemental to the implementation of domestic actions" (our italics).

● *The Nature of Future Commitments: Top-Down or Bottom-Up Definition?*

Two different approaches can be seen in the discussions on the nature of commitments and potential reductions. For the European Union, one must obey scientists and set ambitious targets to keep global warming below 2°C (the top-down approach). Other developed countries such as Japan and New Zealand believe that a bottom-up that starts by examining what what emission reductions are possible in the field approach must prevail. For New Zealand, each country's reduction potential must equal the sum of its potential reductions in each emission-producing sector multiplied by each sector's share in the country's total emissions. Japan, for its part, insists on taking sectoral approaches into account to determine its future medium-term emission reduction target.

The AWG-KP's conclusions were a compromise between these two approaches. Annex I countries' new commitments "should [...] principally take the form of quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs)." The reference to QELROs complies with the European Union's demand. However, the word "principally" creates the possibility of recourse to commitments based on bottom-up approaches. The last paragraph of the conclusions took note

⁹ From the conclusions: "At the first part of its fourth session, the AWG-KP *recognized* that the contribution of Working Group III to the [fourth assessment report] indicates that achieving the lowest levels assessed by the IPCC to date [...] would require Annex I Parties as a group to reduce emissions in a range of 25-40 per cent below 1990 levels [...]."

of the pledges for emission reduction targets announced by some Parties (implicitly: the European Union) and invited other Annex I countries that are “in a position to do so” to submit information on their quantified reduction targets before the seventh session of the AWG-KP (April 2009).

● *Establishing Coherency between the Convention and the Protocol*

During the Bali Conference, some countries and observers expressed regret for reasons of coherency and efficiency that the two discussion processes on the period beyond 2012 under the Convention and under the Protocol were not combined. This point reemerged in the Poznan discussions, with a majority of Annex I countries wanting to merge the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA.

During the AWG-KP’s opening session, Australia, on behalf of the umbrella group, proposed setting up joint sessions of the two ad hoc working groups on the Convention and the Protocol. In the contact group, it opposed setting medium-term targets for Annex I countries on the pretext that there was a need to address this issue in the larger context of discussions on a long-term objective, therefore also involving developing countries. Most other industrialized countries generally supported coherency between the work of the two groups on the Convention and the Protocol. Developing countries for their part reacted poorly to these proposals, stating that the AWG-KP’s mandate was very clear and did not involve defining Annex I countries’ future emission reduction targets.

The AWG-KP’s conclusions on Annex I countries’ future commitments did not establish a direct connection between the Convention working group and the Protocol working group. However, the other conclusions on the work program in 2009 mentioned the need to maintain a coherent approach between the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in conjunction with Annex I Parties’ commitments.

Fighting Deforestation and Forest Degradation: Political Decision Pushed Back to 2009

Deforestation is responsible for approximately 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The issue of its consideration in the new post-2012 agreement, via an incentive mechanism, was introduced in Montreal in 2005, through a proposal by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica supported by several other Parties. Since then, three workshops have been held on setting up a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation. In Bali, the fight against forest degradation was also included. In Poznan, the issue of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) was addressed within the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). The discussions focused on the progress already made and the progress that still needs to be made in regard to methodology. The COP did not reach a decision, which would have given more political and legal weight to this subject.

● *A Step Toward Including Forest Preservation in the Future REDD Mechanism?*

Long discussions were held on considering the role of the conservation and sustainable management of forests, and of increasing forest carbon stocks, beyond deforestation and forest degradation. The Bali Action Plan Policy establishes a difference—symbolized by a semi-colon in the text—between “reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries”, on the one hand, and “the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks” on the other. A REDD mechanism could com-

pensate states that slow or stop deforestation, states that conserve their forests and therefore have very low deforestation rates, and even states that have used plantation policies to attain net reforestation rates such as China and India have done. Nevertheless, these plantations do not provide the same environmental and social benefits that natural forests provide.

The SBSTA's conclusions erase the difference between the two types of action by replacing the semi-colon with a simple comma. Paragraph 4 thus states that: "The SBSTA recommended methodological guidance provided in the annex [...] on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries [...]." Some countries, such as India, interpreted this shift from a semi-colon to a comma as a step in favor of including conservation and sustainable management of forests and enhancing forest carbon stocks in the future REDD mechanism.

● *Few Guarantees on Indigenous Peoples' and Local Communities' Rights*

In Poznan, the discussions also addressed the consideration to be given to indigenous peoples and local communities within the future REDD mechanism. Sixty million indigenous people currently depend directly on forests for their survival. For NGOs, any REDD mechanism will have to ensure that indigenous peoples' and local communities' rights are respected and that forest policies that are unfair to them are not created or strengthened.

The Annex to the SBSTA's conclusions (on methodological guidance) refers to "the need to promote the full and effective participation of indigenous people and local communities, taking into account national circumstances and noting relevant international agreements."¹⁰ This formulation is not legally binding in regard to the means that will be implemented to guarantee the rights of local communities and indigenous peoples. The SBSTA's conclusions nevertheless allow Parties and observers to submit their views on issues relating to indigenous people and local communities by 15 February 2009.

● *Biodiversity: Conspicuously Missing*

The question of biodiversity was not taken into account in the SBSTA's conclusions. Yet, the European Union had proposed referring to it by introducing the need to ensure consistency with relevant international conventions such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the United States and India were opposed to this proposal and refused to tie the Convention on Climate Change to other international conventions.¹¹

● *2009, A More Political Year for REDD?*

Tricky questions still need to be resolved, such as the future mechanism to finance REDD. This issue will probably be addressed in 2009 in the larger context of the discussions on new financing mechanisms in support of developing countries' reduction and adaptation activities. For 2009, the SBSTA has decided to focus its work program on methodology issues in regard to establishing the baselines for greenhouse gas emissions in relation to REDD. The COP should reach a decision in Copenhagen.

¹⁰ Point 1. C) of the Annex to the SBSTA's conclusions on "Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action". Document FCCC/SBSTA/2008/L.23.

¹¹ The same remark is also valid in regard to indigenous peoples' rights since the SBSTA's conclusions do not explicitly refer to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples but simply to "relevant international agreements".

The Pre-2012 Agenda: Some Progress

While attention was focalized on the discussions on the period beyond 2012, the various Parties also expected concrete results on how to improve the Convention's and the Protocol's mechanisms ("pre-2012 agenda"), in particular on making the Adaptation Fund operational, lifting barriers to technology transfers, reforming the development mechanism, and increasing financing for developing countries.

Relative progress was made on the first three points, but the issue of financing has not been resolved.

The Adaptation Fund: Well on the Way to Being Operational

During the third meeting of the Parties to the Protocol in Bali, countries had reached an agreement on the Adaptation Fund's governance. This governance relied on the following triptych: (i) a Board of 16 members representing the Parties to the Protocol and acting under the authority of the Meeting of the Parties; (ii) a secretariat; and (iii) a fiduciary body.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the World Bank were respectively designated to fulfill these two roles on a temporary basis. The Board met three times before Poznan to define the Fund's institutional and legal structure (role and responsibilities of the three bodies, board by-laws, legal provisions for the secretariat and the fiduciary body, the Fund's strategic priorities and policies).

The fourth Meeting of the Parties was mandated to validate progress on these points. It was also supposed to examine the last unresolved points to allow concrete adaptation activities to be financed as early as 2009:

- discussion of guidelines and operational policies (programmatic orientations, administrative and financial management, etc.);
- elaboration of criteria to guarantee the executing agencies' administrative and financial management capabilities;
- monetization of certified emission reductions; and
- definition of legal provisions to make the Fund operational.

In Poznan, all the countries unanimously agreed on the need to make the Adaptation Fund operational as early as possible in 2009. The Parties adopted the Board's proposals on the Fund's institutional and legal structure. However, the discussions focused on the practical modalities for accessing resources, raising legal issues in regard to the Fund's status.

By virtue of the Bali decision, countries may have direct access to resources, or may go through intermediary implementing agencies (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, etc.) or nationally acknowledged executing agencies. The Council is also responsible for managing projects and programs (funding allocation, follow-up, etc.). It does not, however, have an adequate legal status to sign contracts directly with project/program implementers. During its third meeting, the Board had decided to launch a feasibility study to clarify this legal question.

Developing countries (G77/China) went back on this decision. They asked that this question be decided in Poznan in order to allow direct access to financing as soon as possible. For them, accessing financing via implementing agencies is not satisfactory because the proce-

dures are complex and long. The experience of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)¹² and the Convention's funds (Least Developed Country Fund, Special Climate Change Fund) proves this. Consequently, the G77/China asked that the Meeting of the Parties give the Board legal capacity—the only way it would be able to sign contracts directly with project/program implementers. Developed countries, in particular the European Union, supported the proposal made by the Board during its third meeting (feasibility study). They felt it necessary to have more perspective on the practical implications of this or that status granted to the Board. Because of the disagreement, the issue had to be examined by the ministers, who ultimately decided in favor of developing countries' position.

Given the long hours spent discussing these legal questions, the Parties were unable to make progress on the two other key issues for making the Fund operational (operational policies and guidelines, and monetization of carbon credits). Examination of these issues was put off until the Board's fourth meeting from 15 to 17 December 2008.

Consolidation of the Strategic Program on Technology Transfer

During the Bali Conference, technology transfer was the subject of sharp exchanges between developed and developing countries. The latter had succeeded in getting the more operational issues of technology transfers finally tackled (financing, capacity building, barriers to technology transfer, assessment of the effectiveness of actions undertaken, etc.). Industrialized countries were brought up before their commitments, with the obligation of setting up performance indicators to measure and verify the effectiveness of technology transfer actions, and contributing to the identification of new mechanisms to increase technology transfer financing and investments.¹³ A strategic program was supposed to be elaborated by the GEF for the fourteenth Conference of the Parties in order to assess existing projects, new needs, and priorities for the future.

In Poznan, the discussions were consensual in general. The Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) shared its initial work on performance indicators and financing options with the Convention's and Protocol's two subsidiary bodies in charge of scientific advice (SBSTA) and implementation (SBI). The GEF also presented its draft strategic program to increase investment in technology transfer. This draft had already been reworked several times in 2008. The Conference of the Parties adopted the proposed program.

It also asked the GEF to:

- initiate as soon as possible and facilitate the preparation of the projects planned in the program;
- help developing countries elaborate or implement technology needs assessments¹⁴ with the support of implementing agencies (UNDP, World Bank, etc.); and
- overcome the shortcomings seen in its operations when it comes to technology transfer, private sector investment, and innovative project promotion.

¹² The GEF was designated as the financial mechanism of the Convention on Climate Change. The GEF provides financial support in five other areas: biodiversity, international waters, land degradation, ozone depletion, and persistent organic pollutants. Its resources come from OECD countries, and the allocation principle is based on the criterion of additionality: the facility finances the additional cost generated by taking the environment into account in classic development projects. The GEF works in consultation with the Convention but remains independent. Its projects are executed by a dozen or so implementing and executing agencies (World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, Asian Development Bank, etc.).

¹³ Cf. Chetaille, A., *De l'urgence climatique à une réponse politique forte, une route sinueuse - retours sur la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le changement climatique, 3-15 Décembre 2007*, January 2008.

¹⁴ According to the technology transfer framework (2001), developing countries and countries with economies in transition are invited to assess their priority technology needs. This assessment is necessary to determine the types of support specifically in function of countries' national circumstances. Other documents, notably national climate plans and papers, are other useful references in this field.

The GEF shall report to the SBI during its 30th and 31st sessions (June and December 2009) on the progress made on these various points.

Clean Development Mechanism: The Beginnings of Reform

The issue of reforming the CDM is crucial for both before and beyond 2012. This mechanism has not yet fulfilled its double objective of allowing an additional greenhouse gas emission reduction while contributing to the sustainable development of the host countries. Criticized on many fronts, the CDM must be reformed if it is to survive beyond the Protocol's first commitment period. The questions of project additionality (and thereby real emission reductions) and its real contribution to the sustainable development of host countries should be central elements in such a reform. In Poznan, the question of reforming the CDM was discussed, not only in the general framework of the COP/MOP but also under the review of Article 9 of the Kyoto Protocol and within the SBSTA.

The principal points addressed concerned, notably:

- geographic distribution of CDM projects;
- the programmatic CDM; and
- the inclusion of new activities, including carbon capture and storage.

● *Little Progress to Remedy the Unfair Distribution of CDM Projects*

One of the criticisms of the CDM deals with the unequal distribution of CDM projects across potential beneficiary countries and regions. Today, 1,243 projects have been recorded in 51 countries, and more than 3,000 projects are under examination.¹⁵ However, most CDM activities take place in Asia (66%) and Latin America (30%). Africa has barely 3% of projects.

In Poznan, the Africa Group emphasized Africa's specific situation and the need notably to facilitate methodology work in relation to the CDM. Cambodia and other countries pushed in the same direction by asking that the CDM's procedures be simplified for least developed countries. The European Union supported a simplified CDM procedure and methodologies for Africa, least developed countries, and developing small island states. Unfortunately, other countries such as Colombia and Saudi Arabia opposed special treatment for developing countries. As a result, the COP/MOP's final decision only refers to countries "under represented" in the CDM for methodology facilitation.

● *The Programmatic CDM: Toward Operational Guidelines?*

The CDM currently relies on a project-based approach. Transaction costs related to project elaboration are usually relatively high. Shifting to a program-based approach would make it possible to lower these costs. During the Montreal Conference, the COP/MOP decided that a group of projects conducted in the framework of a program of activities could be recorded as a single CDM project.

In Poznan, the COP/MOP explicitly asked the CDM's Executive Committee to continue to develop guidelines that would make it possible to overcome current obstacles to developing the programmatic CDM, notably clarifying the responsibilities and duties of the various parties involved in the project.

¹⁵ An estimated 3 billion CDM credits (certified emission reductions) should be generated by 2012.

● *Divergences on Whether or Not to Include CO₂ Capture and Storage in the CDM*

The question of carbon capture and geological storage (CCS) within the CDM was discussed both by the Parties in the COP/MOP and in the framework of the SBSTA. The European Union proposed establishing a pilot phase for CCS activities in the framework of the CDM. Norway, Japan and Saudi Arabia strongly defended including CCS in the CDM. However, other countries such as Jamaica, Venezuela, Micronesia and even Brazil rejected this proposal because, according to them, this technology has not yet been fully shown to be effective. Brazil mentioned the doubts in regard to the non-permanence of stored carbon. In the end, the SBSTA was not able to reach a conclusion on this subject because of the divergences between the Parties. However, in the framework of the COP/MOP's decision on the CDM, the Executive Committee was tasked with drawing up the technological, methodological and legal implications of including CCS in the CDM and reporting on them at the conference in Copenhagen.

Financing: Needs Still Not Met

As it had on many other subjects, the economic crisis inserted itself into the discussions on the climate. It once again shined a spotlight on the financing stakes in the fight against climate change. The Convention Secretariat's report on investments, produced in 2007 and updated in 2008, once again spoke of needs reaching hundreds of billions of dollars.

From the opening of the Conference to the ministers' speeches, the question of financing was omnipresent, especially in developing countries' discourse. It was unanimous on the fact that financing should not be a pretext to do nothing to fight climate change. The economic and climate challenges must be tackled simultaneously, as Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations stated. The developing countries that regularly demand new, additional, sustainable resources to implement the Convention and the Protocol domestically did not fail to emphasize the fact that states' real political will like the will they showed in the emergency response to the economic crisis is all that would be needed to free the necessary resources.

More concretely, the negotiations on implementing the Convention's and the Protocol's financing provisions—fourth review of the financial mechanism (GEF), COP's orientation in the GEF, the Least Developed Country Fund—generated rather tense discussions between developing and developed countries. On most of these points, the criticisms issued by developing countries are not new:

- complexity of the GEF's procedures to access funds, linked in particular to implementation of the resource allocation framework (RAF) in early 2007 (see box "Resource Allocation Framework: Results and Prospects");
- insufficiency of amounts compared to needs, in particular for adaptation to climate change;
- the funds' lack of predictability; and
- the risk of financing fragmentation in relation to the multiplication of non-UN financial initiatives (the World Bank's new fund, for example).

For its primary donors, the GEF has a role to play to catalyze investment, notably private sector investment. The reforms within the GEF must allow it to become more efficient and more effective, and better meet the needs of developing countries. These debates took place at a time when the GEF must prepare its fifth reconstitution period.¹⁶ In order to avoid a gap in

¹⁶ Donor countries contribute to the GEF in 4-year periods (restitutions). Since it was created in 1991, there have been four reconstitutions, with the latest—"GEF4"—going from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2010.

the programming of its activities, the discussions on reconstituting the GEF-5 began at the end of 2008. They are supposed to end in early 2010.¹⁷ While developing countries are very critical of the GEF, they nevertheless call for donors to contribute to the fifth reconstitution of the GEF and for the results of the mid-term assessment of the resource allocation framework to be taken into account (see box “Resource Allocation Framework: Results and Prospects”).

These last two demands which were taken into account by the Conference of the Parties in its decisions on the fourth review of the financial mechanism and the GEF’s orientation, take into account a certain number of developing countries’ demands. In regard to the small amount of financing available, the responses provided by the Conference of the Parties in Poznan remain inferior to noted needs:

- **Least Developed Country Fund:** The decision invites the GEF to better inform potential donors of predictable and appropriate resource needs.
- **Second review of the Protocol (Article 9):** Despite long hours of negotiations, the countries involved were not able to reach an agreement on the question of extending the tax levied on the CDM, which is intended to feed the Adaptation Fund, to other flexibility mechanisms. For developing countries, the lack of an agreement on this point is one of the major failures in Poznan.

¹⁷ The GEF5 will cover the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2014.

> Resource Allocation Framework: Results and Prospects

The resource allocation framework was set up out of a desire for efficiency in order to maximize the impact of the GEF’s limited resources on improving the world’s environment. The RAF was also expected to provide a framework for programming actions in countries according to their priorities, better predictability for available financing, and a set of procedures to improve transparency in resource allocation. A mid-term assessment was made public during the GEF Board meeting in November 2008 and the 14th Conference of the Parties to the Convention. The conclusions of this assessment corroborate certain criticisms by developing countries. The complexity of the RAF’s implementation rules do not allow flexible and dynamic use of the resources in light of the GEF-4’s relatively small amounts. It did not make the RAF more transparent.

The least developed countries are, as a whole, the most penalized by the complexity of procedures notably because of their poor institutional capacities. However, the assessment does not call into question the relevance of a needs-based allocation system given the GEF’s limited resources. Among the organizations that have performance-based resource allocation systems, the GEF is the organization that intervenes in the most countries and with the smallest financial amounts. Finally, the assessment provided several recommendations for the current GEF reconstitution (GEF-4) and the next (2010-2014).

In the short term for the end of the GEF-4, the GEF has notably been invited to simplify RAF implementation rules. For the GEF-5, the assessment recommends in particular improving financing predictability and better acknowledgement of cross-border environmental issues.

Cooling of the Climate Between Industrialized and Developing Countries: A Passing Phase?

Industrialized Countries' Lack of Exemplarity

The failure of the Poznan conference is largely due to the lack of a leader on the international scene among developed countries. The AWG-KP's fairly unambitious conclusions reveal the timidity of developed countries.

The United States represented by the Bush administration had adopted a policy of silence. While Barack Obama's recent victory was synonymous with optimism during the conference in Poznan, a cloud of uncertainty still hangs over the United States' future level of commitment. Canada, for its part, insisted on the high cost of fighting climate change. Japan remained very evasive in regard to a future absolute reduction target for its emissions in the medium-term, announcing that this target would be revealed "in good time". It also changed sides in regard to sectoral approaches to establish future reduction objectives for Annex I countries (bottom-up approach).

Although Europe publicly reiterated its unilateral (-20%) and conditional (-30%) emission reduction objectives for 2020, it found itself bogged down until the end of the Poznan conference in the European negotiations on the energy-climate package (*see box below*). This position "neither here nor there" did not allow it to play a driving role among Annex I countries. The declarations of some member-states, such as Italy's on the un-advisability of the Energy-Climate Package during an economic crisis, weakened its credibility during the negotiations.

Industrialized countries' lack of exemplarity, combined with their refusal to commit in a binding manner on financial support for developing countries, largely explains the failure of the Poznan conference.

Developing Countries: Between Convergences and Divergences

As in Bali, the G77 and China presented developed countries with a united front. One year from the signature of an agreement on the climate regime beyond 2012, their intransigence on several subjects related to improving implementation of the Convention and the Protocol and to the period beyond 2012 marked the minds of many negotiators and observers. Exemplary commitments from developed countries on mitigation and increased financing, and facilitated access to technologies for current and future needs were the primary bones of contention during these two weeks of negotiations. Yet, in the eyes of developing countries, these subjects did not receive all the attention they deserved. This does not bode well for the concessions developing countries could make in regard to their participation in the collective effort to reduce emissions.

While developing countries spoke with one voice on the whole, relatively divergent positions emerged in the contact groups on the period beyond 2012. The diversity of interests present within the G77/China is becoming increasingly visible. The AOSIS is calling loudly for the international community to set ambitious reduction targets (temperature, emission peak, the contributions of different groups of countries). They are particularly proactive when it comes to concrete proposals on adaptation and risk management. Overall, LDCs face the same

adaptation and mitigation challenges. Their proposals, however, are less precise when it comes to the quantitative targets to include in the future climate agreement. Unlike the previous conferences, the Africa group, represented by Algeria, was particularly present in the discussions, with firm positions also taken on the issues of mitigation and financing. The joint declaration by the European Union and Africa adopted at the end of November probably helped further solidify their positions in the international climate change negotiations. In this declaration, Africa and the European Union emphasize their concerns about global warming and state their shared determination to achieve an ambitious international agreement on the period beyond 2012.

The New Impetus Needed for Copenhagen

Poznan turned out to be what some had predicted: an intermediary conference between Bali and Copenhagen. The political will was not there and the countries were unable to use the conference to generate the vitality necessary to conclude an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen. Nevertheless, the countries decided to shift to negotiating mode in 2009. Several sessions in addition to the Copenhagen conference are planned in order to reach a new agreement on the period beyond 2012 in December 2009 (*see the 2009 schedule below*). The balance of powers present should shift considerably in very little time. The mobilization of leader countries and creation of alliances in the coming months will be unavoidable to reach an ambitious and fair agreement by the end of 2009. The latest scientific data should be taken into account.

Looking for Leaders...

Europe has agreed on its plan of action to fight climate change by 2020 by adopting the Energy-Climate Package (*see box below*). However, many things remain to be clarified, notably in regard to mandatory financial support for developing countries.

> The Energy-Climate Package

The Heads of State adopted the European Energy-Climate Package on 12 December 2008, the last day of the Conference in Poznan. The "3 x 20" objectives were confirmed (20% emission reduction, 20% renewable energy, and 20% energy savings by 2020) but no financial mechanism was enacted to support developing countries' emission reductions and adaptation actions. In addition, the modalities to attain the future reduction target open the door to compensation for Europe. Indeed, the member-states will be authorized to make use of flexibility mechanisms to attain up to 72% of their reduction targets (excluding the CO₂ quota market). Yet, developing countries firmly reminded the parties in Poznan that industrialized countries' priority should be to reduce their own domestic greenhouse gas emissions, and that flexibility mechanisms should only supplement these national reductions.

Finally, the target of -20% greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 is still far below scientific recommendations to avoid a dangerous change in the climate. Europe has committed to a ... / ...

more ambitious emission reduction target, -30% by 2020, but only in the context of an ambitious overall international agreement on climate change in Copenhagen and “provided that other developed countries commit themselves to **comparable** emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries **contribute adequately according to** their responsibilities and respective capabilities” (emphasis ours). This commitment is, therefore, conditional on the behaviors of other countries.

The role of the United States will be equally decisive in fostering the attainment of an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen. The recent election of Barack Obama revitalizes the UN climate negotiations. As president-elect, Mr. Obama made it known that the United States would commit actively in the multilateral negotiation process in 2009. He announced that the United States’ greenhouse gas emissions would be brought down to their 1990 level by 2020, and reduced by 80% compared to 1990 levels by 2050. He plans several climate measures (see box below). Nevertheless, this objective remains weak compared to the efforts needed to avoid dangerous and irreversible climate change. The active participation of the United States in the multilateral negotiations will also be conditional on passing a national law, which must be adopted by Congress. The new president has less than one year to accomplish this. It will probably be a difficult job.

> **The New American Administration’s Legislative Projects on the Climate**

To attain these objectives, Barack Obama is betting on the creation of a federal “cap and trade” system, similar to the European system, in which 100% of emission permits are auctioned. The Obama-Biden energy plan also calls for 10% of the energy consumed in the United States in 2012 (25% in 2025) to come from renewable sources of energy, and for the demand for electricity to be cut by 15% compared to the projected 2020 level.


Other environmentally highly controversial measures are also envisaged, such as the recourse to nuclear energy and development of agrofuel.

... and New Alliances

Coalitions between industrialized and developing countries should be sought in order to be able to reach an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen. The large emerging countries like China, India and Brazil have already put in place domestic policies and/or measures to fight climate change. However, they still refuse to commit more as long as industrialized countries have not proven their determination to fight climate change effectively at home. What is more, the Bali equation under which developing countries will begin national actions after 2012 to reduce their emissions in exchange for financial and technological support has not yet been resolved. The issues of financing and technology transfer will be decisive in determining developing countries’ future emission limitation actions. Industrialized countries, despite a few new proposals on setting up sustainable and adequate financing, came to Poznan without a mandate on this issue. This stubborn silence cannot persist in 2009; if it does, the Copenhagen conference risks being a failure.

Taking the Latest Scientific Studies into Account

Finally, Poznan should lead the international community to take into account “new science”, that is to say recent scientific work since the publication of the fourth IPCC report in 2007. The AOSIS group, supported by the least advanced countries, as well as Al Gore in a speech given during the Conference, have called on the international community to orient itself toward a scenario of a greenhouse gas concentration of 350 ppm CO₂ eq in order to keep global warming under 1.5°C by the end of the century. Consequently, the LDCs and AOSIS have asked industrialized countries to reduce their emissions by 40% by 2020 compared to the 1990 level. According to the AOSIS group, the entire international community should acknowledge that the “survival” of small developing island states is a crucial principle. ●



What Operational Implications for Development Stakeholders?

■ *Swan Fauveaud (GERES)*¹⁸

Introduction

The Mobilization of Development & Relief NGOs on Climate Change: A Rise in Power?

Climate change is happening. Developing countries, especially least developed countries and island states, will be most affected. In these countries, agricultural activities are at the heart of the economy, and 50% to 80% of the energy used by households comes from biomass taken from forests. The largest climatic variability (droughts, floods, rising sea level, etc.) predicted by experts will notably affect farming and forests, weaken food security, and affect the poorest populations' health and living conditions. These harmful effects will be aggravated by the rising prices of energy, the principal component in domestic life, economic development, and access to education and health services.

To adapt to climate change, populations will need to change their ways of life: farming practices, use of natural resources, recourse to alternative sources of energy, etc. The climate and development are closely linked.

In response to this observation, the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol define mechanisms intended to help developing countries adapt to climate change and take a lower-carbon path.

Acting on development logics, development and relief non-governmental organizations (D&R NGOs) are progressively becoming aware of their potential role in fighting climate change. Even when D&R NGOs do not explicitly take these challenges into account in their initial strategies, their practices generally contribute indirectly to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of the poorest countries and to these countries' adaptation to climate change. From a strategic standpoint, D&R NGOs now recognize the need to take a stand on climate change.¹⁹ However, they encounter numerous constraints on integrating climate change fully into their operations: a lack of practical information, the complexity of elaborating and monitoring "car-

¹⁸ Writing and proofreading assistance for Chapter 2 provided by Anne Chetaille, GRET.

¹⁹ Cf. Chetaille A., *Lutte contre le changement climatique : quel rôle pour les organisations de solidarité internationale ?*, Étude et travaux en ligne No. 16, GRET, November 2007.

bon" finance projects (Clean Development Mechanism), a lack of financing for the potential "additional costs" generated by the CDM, the complexity of Kyoto Protocol project funds and mechanisms, and their compatibility with D&R NGOs' projects.

International Climate Negotiations: Growing Participation by D&R NGOs

Every year, nearly 10,000 people attend the climate negotiations, following the official discussions and taking part in the various side events, which are opportunities for exchange and useful sources of information. Over the past two years, we have seen more and more participation by D&R NGOs alongside environmental NGOs: large international networks (such as Care International, OXFAM and Christian Aid), and national NGOs (FORS, a Czech NGO, 11-11-11, a Belgian NGO, etc.).

French D&R NGOs also took part in these negotiations. In Poznan, Coordination SUD, GERES and GRET were present in order to follow interesting issues for their advocacy, expertise (on financing, for instance) and field activities. In regard to this last point, the operational implications of the Convention's and Protocol's decisions, especially those in Poznan, were more precisely evaluated. This task was entrusted to GERES.

This evaluation focused on two themes at the juncture with D&R NGOs' issues: the clean development mechanism (CDM), and reducing emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD).

- **The Clean Development Mechanism.** Sharply criticized for its complexity, the CDM is still little accessible as a possible financing mechanism for D&R NGOs. The progress in the negotiations on the programmatic CDM offers new prospects.
- **Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD).** The fight against deforestation and forest degradation became one of the pillars of the Bali negotiations and will be included in the regime beyond 2012. It takes on its full meaning with the D&R NGOs that have historically been involved in areas relating to rural development, natural resource management, and access to energy for the most vulnerable populations. At a time when the Convention on Climate Change emphasizes the necessity of implementing pilot experiments, D&R NGOs have an opportunity to be active participants in the discussions by highlighting their field experience.

This summary shall attempt to:

- report on the status of the discussions on these two topics, including the decisions reached in Poznan;
- assess the relevance and utility of these tools for D&R NGOs; and
- present D&R NGOs' experiences on these two topics.

The methodology used for this assessment relies on several sources of information (see *Appendix 3*):

- the Conference's side events;
- interviews with several resource people concerned by the "climate and development" issue (representatives of D&R NGOs, donors, technical cooperation agencies, research institutes, UN agencies, etc.); and
- relevant bibliographical references.

Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to Increase D&R NGOs' Involvement

Reducing Emissions in Developing Countries: CDM Implementation Status

● *The CDM: From the "Project" Approach...*

The CDM is one of the Kyoto Protocol's "flexibility" mechanisms. It connects Annex I countries (industrialized countries subject to reduction commitments) and developing countries. Its operating rules were set in Marrakech in 2001.

In principle, the CDM allows Annex I countries to invest in greenhouse gas reduction projects in developing countries. In exchange, these countries receive credits that they can either sell on the international market or record to attain their own reduction targets. The CDM has also been assigned a second objective: contribute to the host countries' sustainable development. Today, the projects cover several fields, notably energy savings, fuel changes, renewable energy, and forestation/reforestation activities (carbon sequestration). Initiated by public and private investors, these projects must generate certified emission reduction units (CERUs).

Its record is middling. Too often, it seems to be used by industrialized countries as a simple offsetting mechanism to attain their reduction targets. It is rarely accompanied by adequate measures to reduce domestic emissions. Finally, most projects are not very additional and do not contribute to the host countries' sustainable development.

Reforming the CDM, notably to improve this mechanism's environmental and social integrity, therefore seems crucial.

● *... to the "Program" Approach*

The programmatic CDM was proposed during the COP11/MOP1 in Montreal in 2005, in order to extend the CDM to "programmes of activities [...] that can be registered as a single CDM project activity", and thereby attempt to simplify procedures for project implementers. This CDM defines a "program of activities" within which projects can follow each other in time and space.

The programmatic CDM was described during the 32nd meeting of the Executive Board²⁰ in Annex 38, paragraph 1, as:

- a voluntary action,
- allowing implementation of a policy/measure or stated goal,
- coordinated by a public or private entity,
- that leads to additional emission reductions.

The programmatic approach is organized on two levels: the program and its activities.

A single entity coordinates the program and provides a methodological, organizational, fi-

²⁰ A governance body mandated by the UNFCCC, the Executive Board supervises the establishment of the CDM, registers CDM projects (methodology validation), delivers CERs, and accredits the designated operational entities.

nancial and geographical framework within which activities are added. New activities can be incremented throughout the set duration of the program of activities (28 years for classic projects and 60 years for forestation/reforestation projects).

Even though the first idea is seductive, the CDM's Executive Board now wants to make the programmatic CDM operational. To date, no projects have been recorded. The Executive Board therefore decided to launch a public consultation in 2008, in order to understand why project developers have not managed to define programmatic CDMs.

● *The Poznan Decisions*

In regard to the "project" CDM, several delegations from least developed countries emphasized the uneven geographic distribution of projects and the need to simplify procedures for geographic areas lacking projects (Africa, the least developed countries in Southeast Asia, developing small island states, etc.). The COP/MOP's final decision indicated the launch of reflection on facilitating methodologies for countries that are "under-represented" in the CDM.

In regard to the programmatic CDM, the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP) recommended that the Executive Board give priority to continuing work to make the programmatic CDM operational by establishing guidelines for the program of activities. More specifically, this framework must clarify institutional duties, the involvement of designated operational entities²¹ in validating and verifying programs of activities, and the definition of responsibilities and obligations for the various actors involved in developing programs. This must be done while keeping in mind the goal of lifting the remaining barriers to implementing the program approach.

The CDM: A Tool for D&R NGOs?

● *CDM "Projects": Appropriateness and Constraints*

As mentioned above, the CDM's procedures are long, complex and costly. Its high transactions costs discriminate against small projects that do not have economies of scale. These comments also apply to project implementers such as D&R NGOs. They are rarely able to formalize projects within the CDM or do not really see any strategic interest in investing in such a process. In Poznan, the conclusion was that D&R NGOs still have very little access to carbon finance for the following reasons:

- There is still a strong cultural barrier to integrating carbon finance and conducting the monitoring and verification procedures imposed by the CDM.
- D&R NGOs lack human and financial capacities to write project documents and set up emission reduction monitoring systems. Use of the CDM assumes detailed knowledge of its project cycle.
- D&R NGOs have little pre-financing resources to launch CDM projects. Even though their projects have every chance of becoming financially independent thanks to the sale of carbon credits, they are not very able to invest or borrow funds, unlike businesses.

Nevertheless, the CDM context is more favorable to them today:

- A first reform of the CDM made it possible to create a small-scale project category and the possibility of bundling several projects together. The small-scale CDM proposes cal-

²¹ The designated operational entities (DOEs) are private organizations accredited by the Executive Board that validate and verify CDM projects and inform the public.

ulation methods and a monitoring system that are less cumbersome to implement. It is a real opportunity for D&R NGOs because it makes the process less complicated and lowers transaction costs. The same is true of project bundling.

- While one of the main criticisms focuses on CDM projects' lack of additionality, development and solidarity projects turn out to be particularly additional in regard to emission reduction. Among other things, they contribute to the economic development of the area where they are implemented and have considerable social impact (health, education). Thanks to their detailed knowledge of local challenges, their projects are part of a sustainable approach and have a large impact on sustainable development. They must receive a positive reception from the Executive Board and the designated national authorities (DNAs) that evaluate and validate CDM projects in host countries.

As a consequence, these D&R NGOs still need to overcome the methodological barriers, and improve their CDM project cycle capacities (writing key documents, emission reduction monitoring process, verification, and entering into contracts with DOEs).

● *The "Program" Approach: Appropriateness and Constraints*

The "project" CDM's record shows that it is particularly well suited to situations that allow it to intervene on large and localized sources of greenhouse gas emissions.

Let us look at an example: a methanation plant installed at the dump site of a large urban center in a developing country. This system makes it possible to control emissions of methane, which has a particularly strong warming effect²², and simultaneously produce electricity or heat by burning this gas. The technology is complex and effective (control of waste supply flow and methanation, high-tech converter and generator, etc.). Eligible for the CDM, this system processes a large and localized source of a greenhouse gas generated by the landfill. Collecting data to value emission reductions in a CDM is relatively simple and integrated in the system.

Let us look at this same objective of lowering methane emissions, but this time in a rural area of a developing country. The targets are the numerous small cattle farms, the animal waste from which emits methane. The operation consists of introducing individual biodigesters on each farm. Technologically simple equipment, these biodigesters make it possible to recuperate methane and produce electricity (lighting, television) or heat (cooking) for the household. Individual projects like this generate modest emission reductions that are difficult to measure and verify.

The programmatic approach is, in this case, more suitable to develop small-scale technologies whose dissemination is scattered over time and space and that enables a greenhouse gas emission reduction for each unit of technology distributed²³. Each project implementer distributing biodigesters in the set zone can join the program at any time during the program's 28-year period of validity. They use a shared methodology base that merely needs to be replicated. The amount of emission reductions within the program can end up being very large.

As a result, D&R NGOs' projects that generally favor the dissemination of small-scale technologies to multiple end users (households, local governments, etc.) will find a simpler framework in a programmatic CDM. It must be able to include numerous other low-power technologies such as efficient ovens, solar cell kits, and small hydroelectric plants.

²² Methane (CH₄) is a greenhouse gas that has an overall warming power 25 times that of carbon dioxide (CO₂).

²³ Idea developed and illustrated in "Potential and Barriers for End-Use Energy Efficiency under Programmatic CDM", UNEP CD 4 CDM.

The largest constraint for D&R NGOs today lies in the fact that the programmatic CDM is not sufficiently operational. Despite a mechanism that is in theory advantageous, for the moment they see the potential difficulties due to its procedures and, instead, stick with the status quo. For now, international cooperation organizations seem more comfortable with this new approach. For instance, the German technical cooperation agency, GTZ, is thinking about setting up a programmatic CDM in Africa to distribute fuel-efficient ovens.

Experience and Feedback

Some testimony given in Poznan illustrated the strategies adopted by D&R NGOs to overcome the barriers of CDM complexity. They generally correspond to pooling knowledge and experience.

● *SouthSouthNorth*

The organization **SouthSouthNorth** (SSN) spoke in various side events to share its approach. This platform brings together international research institutes, NGOs and local governments, and has positioned itself to provide support to those who implement CDM projects that have high economic and social added value. For the past five years, it has facilitated CDM projects' eligibility in Indonesia, South Africa, etc. These projects are implemented by public (NGOs, municipalities, etc.) and private stakeholders.

For instance, the Grameen Shakti organization ("non-profit company" status), based in Bangladesh and specialized in renewable energy distribution, is receiving the **SouthSouthNorth** platform's support to validate its project with the CDM bodies. The project aims to equip approximately 30,000 rural households with solar panels. It is in the process of being validated. These solar panels will provide electricity (lighting, radio, TV). **SouthSouthNorth's** experts commented on the project document that Grameen Shakti will submit to the CDM bodies.

For more information, visit: www.southsouthnorth.org

● *Carbon Solidarity Asia*

Carbon Solidarity Asia (CSA) also announced its launch during the conference. A cooperative of Asian development NGOs and eco-companies, it has a dozen founding members based in Nepal, India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, China and Bangladesh. CSA members share the fact that they all implement renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. These projects have particularly strong socioeconomic and environmental benefits. CSA offers to pool its members' knowledge to make their projects eligible for the CDM and sell emission reduction units. CSA will be operational in mid-2009. Two of its members were present in Poznan (GERES Cambodia and ARTI India).

For more information, visit: www.geres-cambodia.org

A Mechanism to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: Opportunities in Sight for D&R NGOs?

Elaboration of the REDD Mechanism: State of the Discussions

● *Deforestation, a Phenomenon that Contributes to Climate Change*

Developing mitigation strategies through forestry activities is a major stake. Indeed, forests (trees and forest lands) have a noteworthy ability to sequester carbon. In addition, deforestation is the source of 17% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The “forest” sector is the third largest source of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, behind the energy sector and industry. Most of these emissions come from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The principal causes of this deforestation are many: agriculture, stock farming, extraction of wood products (timber, pulp, firewood), infrastructure development (roads), etc.

● *Emergence of the Notion of Avoided Deforestation*

In the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, no type of instrument or incentive has until now been planned to fight deforestation in developing countries.

In the framework of the Bali Action Plan, the countries decided to introduce reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in the negotiation process for the new climate agreement beyond 2012 (see chapter 1). They also decided to set up pilot actions during 2008 and 2009. These experiences should provide useful feedback to elaborate an “REDD” mechanism in this new agreement.

Today, a major question remains unanswered on the modalities of an international mechanism that can provide a universal response to a problem with multiple causes.

The answer to this question will notably depend on the decisions made on the following two points:

– **Type of financial mechanism: recourse to the carbon market or public financing?**

In the case of recourse to carbon finance (emission reductions converted into sellable credits), there is a risk of increasing land pressure and creating a carbon “rent”. In addition, the results of policies to fight deforestation will be indexed on the results of a financial market. If it collapses (a sharp drop in the price of a ton of carbon), REDD’s impact on emission reduction will be highly marginal.

In the case of public finance, which involves creating a fund, the actors concerned could have greater flexibility in the use of funds (capacity building, easier resolution of land conflicts, etc.) and not focus on emission reduction actions alone. However, the issues of resource sustainability and the risk of diverting these resources from their intended purpose are present.²⁴

²⁴ RAC-F, ENDA, Nicolas Hulot Foundation, *Vers un accord équitable sur le climat pour l’après 2012, Propositions du réseau climat-développement* (2008).

– **A National Approach and/or a Project Approach?**

A national approach to deforestation would allow for more coherency between public policies, and appropriation by countries. It would, however, raise difficulties when it comes to defining a reference scenario and could run up against corruption problems with the states' use of the money. A project approach would allow local actors to be involved, improve attractiveness for investors, and seems to be appropriate for countries with weak governance. It would, however, generate the risk of "leaks" (pushing deforestation out of project zones) and would not make it possible to treat national causes.²⁵

The REDD mechanism therefore raises numerous methodological and technical issues, behind which hide important political stakes.

● *The Poznan Decisions*

As recalled in part 1, Poznan was the opportunity to examine the methodological aspects of REDD in light of past and future progress. In substance, no political decisions were reached on REDD mechanism modalities, notably on the types of financing and approaches to favor (national or project).

The participants' attention was drawn to the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities in elaborating the mechanism. The NGOs present in Poznan stated that any REDD mechanism must ensure that their rights are respected and must not create or strengthen forest policies that are unfair to them.

What Role for D&R NGOs in Defining and Implementing the REDD Mechanism?

● *Forests: a Major Stake for Development and Adaptation to Climate Change*

In addition to their role in mitigating climate change, forests have a central place in the lives of the communities that live near them.

They help regulate water regimes and local micro-climates, and help prevent soil erosion.

They provide local communities with many goods and services (firewood, non-wood forest products, etc.).²⁶ In all, more than 800 million people live in or near tropical forests and depend on them to meet their needs. In this context, forests play an important role in terms of adapting to climate disturbances.

● *The Historical Involvement of D&R NGOs in Forest Management Programs: a Precursor to REDD?*

Forests' role in alleviating poverty and protecting the environment has historically been at the heart of what concerns development stakeholders (local authorities and NGOs, development and relief NGOs, etc.).

Numerous initiatives in this field have been identified since the 1980s. These programs focus, for example, on replacing firewood with other sources of energy, disseminating agricultural techniques that are alternatives to shifting agriculture, multi-purpose reforestation (energy, general purpose wood), setting up agroforestry cultivation systems, etc.

²⁵ RAC-F, ENDA, Equiterre, *Renforcement de capacités des ONG francophones, Les enjeux climat pour l'après 2012* (2007).

²⁶ Locatelli, B., *Les forêts tropicales dans les politiques sur le changement climatique*, CIRAD (2007).

● *Participating in the Definition of a Policy Framework for REDD:
What Role for D&R NGOs?*

The REDD mechanism potentially offers D&R NGOs new opportunities, notably in terms of financing forestry-related projects (agro-forestry, sustainable forest management, etc.) and optimizing other development activities necessary for efficient and effective implementation of the REDD mechanism.

D&R NGOs' access to "REDD" financing depends in larger part on the practical modalities chosen, notably for financing modes and types of approach. In this case, public funds and a "project" approach would probably be most appropriate even though they have other risks. The question of fund utilization (the fight against deforestation and/or forest degradation, plantations, etc.) is also a decisive factor in D&R NGOs' access to "REDD" financing. In regard to optimization opportunities, D&R NGOs have a role to play in setting up local governance for the REDD mechanism given their proximity to local stakeholders (community organizations, local authorities, the private sector, etc.).

This support could deal with the following activities:

- strengthening local actors (NGOs, communities, public authorities) to establish REDD processes, notably setting up and managing activities and elaborating methodologies (calculation of the reference scenario, emission reduction quantification, or sequestration level); and
- land conflict resolution.

To seize these opportunities, D&R NGOs must participate actively in the debates underway on REDD.

Experience and Feedback: Project Optimization in an REDD Mechanism

Numerous pilot initiatives of REDD-eligible projects were presented during the side events. They reveal D&R NGOs' awareness of the possibility of optimizing their actions in the framework of the REDD mechanism.

● *Community Forest Management: Illustration in Senegal*

The "Kyoto: Think Global, Act Global" program took an interest in sites in Africa and Asia²⁷ that have sustainable forest management practices based on community forest management. Carbon sequestration monitoring systems were set up in the framework of this program from 2003 to 2009 in order to measure their impacts in terms of "avoided deforestation".

The work with communities made it possible to train them in conducting forest inventories, demarcation, and mapping forested areas with the help of a GPS system. In this way, carbon storage over time was assessed to measure carbon sequestration. This work over approximately five years showed storage of 1.5 to 11 tons per hectare depending on the site and country in question.

The NGO ENDA, present in Poznan, contributed to this assessment of the Toboronto forest in southeast Senegal. This zone benefited from the PROGEDE²⁸ program from 1997 to 2005.

²⁷ Nepal and Utarkand in the Himalayan region, Tanzania, Senegal, Mali and Guinea-Bissau, Papua New Guinea.

²⁸ Programme de gestion durable et participative des énergies traditionnelles et de substitution (sustainable and participatory management of traditional and substitution energies program).

Aiming to protect natural resources and alleviate poverty, it made it possible to establish forest plantations (nurseries, etc.), protect water catchments for herds, introduce beehives to limit the destruction of wild bees' colonies, and install henhouses to limit hunting of wild forest game, etc. The results of ENDA's study, which was published in 2006, show that PRO-DEGE made it possible to reconstitute part of the forest stand, introducing average sequestration of 7 tons of CO₂ per hectare, and improving communities' living conditions.

The next stage is to optimize sustainable management of the Toborconto stand within an REDD system even though one has not yet been defined in the regime beyond 2012. ENDA, like most community forestry operators, is waiting for the decisions on REDD beyond 2012.

● *Uncertainties*

One of the major remaining uncertainties for D&R NGOs deals with the methodology requirements that the REDD mechanism will have. For example, in this pilot experience, villagers were able to collect the data to calculate sequestration using simple and relatively inexpensive methods. However, if the future procedures end up being as complex as the current CDM's procedures, the difficulty accessing REDD financing for such initiatives will be an issue again.

Another remaining difficulty is the ability to propose a reliable and inexpensive system to monitor carbon storage. During the conference, several examples were given of the practical problems that project implementers risk facing. Therefore, on one side we find monitoring systems that mobilize local populations like the ones presented above. On the other side, we find more complex, more costly, and more reliable monitoring systems that rely on the use of satellite images at different dates and field surveys.

Conclusion

This deciphering of the CDM and REDD shows the numerous opportunities that are open to D&R NGOs in terms of involvement in implementing the Protocol and defining the new climate agreement beyond 2012.

It is still crucial that they take an active part in 2009 in the preparations for the 15th Conference of the Parties planned for December 2009 in Copenhagen. D&R NGOs must notably begin to dialogue with the negotiators and share their field experiences to contribute to the reform of the CDM and the definition of the rules for REDD.

The outcome of this preparation will be their participation in the Copenhagen Conference for better understanding of the stakes and to foster exchanges with all actors involved.

What is more, the experiences presented in this chapter show that pooling experience and knowledge has allowed some D&R NGOs to overcome the difficulties understanding the mechanisms in the Convention and the Protocol. Greater collective mobilization by D&R NGOs is crucial to speed up their capacity to take into account the phenomenon in their strategies and align their actions with the institutional and financial mechanisms of the Convention and the Protocol.

Networks of NGOs, such as Coordination SUD for development and RAC-F for the climate, have a role to play in terms of educating D&R NGOs in climate change and sharing expertise on the subject. ●

APPENDIX 1

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
ARTI	Appropriate Rural Technology Institute
AWG-KP	Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
COP	Conference of the Parties
D&R NGO	development & relief non-governmental organization
DNA	Designated National Authority
DOE	Designated Operational Entity
EGTT	Expert Group on Technology Transfer
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GERES	Groupe Energies Renouvelables, Environnement et Solidarités
GRET	Research and Technological Exchange Group
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MOP	Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
NAPA	National Adaptation Program of Action
NGO	non-governmental organization
QELRO	Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objective
RAC-F	Réseau Action Climat France
RAF	Resource Allocation Framework
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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Coordination SUD

(Solidarité - Urgence - Développement)

Founded in 1994, **Coordination SUD** ("SUD" for Solidarity, Relief, Development), the French national platform of international solidarity NGOs, brings together more than 130 NGOs. These NGOs carry out humanitarian relief and development assistance.

In the framework of its advocacy and international cooperation activities, Coordination SUD has set up commissions and working groups, spaces for consultation between NGOs and working out common positions and advocacy.

The Coordination SUD Climate Change Group gathers about fifteen NGO members of Coordination SUD and environmental NGOs, members of Climate Action Network-France, who are working about climate change issues and links with development.

The Climate Change Group was created in 2007 while preparing the follow-up program of the French EU-presidency of Coordination SUD. Its objectives are :

- the exchange of experience and expertise between French solidarity and environmental NGOs;
- capacity building and the construction of common positions for international negotiations on climate change.

The main objective of this group is to work on the follow-up of the international negotiations for the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) and the Protocol of Kyoto and the adoption of a new agreement on climate change after 2012.

- > Web site: www.coordinationsud.org
E-mail: sud@coordinationsud.org
14 passage Dubail 75010 Paris, France
Tel.: 01 44 72 93 72
Fax: 01 44 72 93 73

Climate Action Network-France

Climate Action Network-France (CAN-F) was created in 1996, just before the Kyoto Summit. CAN-F is a non-profit organisation fighting climate change and has a Council of 12 members French NGOs active in environment protection, renewable energy promotion and sustainable transportation. CAN-F is the French representative of Climate Action Network International (CAN International) which is a worldwide network of more than 430 NGOs which are recognized experts in that field from both North and South.

As an observer to the UNFCCC, CAN-F participates in international negotiations on climate change. Its main missions are to inform, raise awareness and ensure that public policies are up to the challenge of climate change.

- > Web site: www.rac-f.org
E-mail: infos@rac-f.org
2B rue Jules Ferry 93100 Montreuil, France
Tel.: 01 48 58 83 92
Fax: 01 48 51 95 12

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GRET



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